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Abstract 
Despite declining in 2001, foreign direct investment (FDI) surged during the 1990s. As a result, 
current levels of FDI flows are triple their 1990 levels.  It is well documented in the literature that 
FDI occurs in large part among countries that are geographically close. It is also well established 
that the NAFTA had a significant impact on both U.S. FDI flows and hence FDI stocks.  In 
addition, tax policies and tax treaties have been shown to be important drivers of U.S. FDI. The 
analysis presented in this paper confirms these earlier results. We extend the analysis, however, to 
show that tax treaties have a significant impact on financing patterns of U.S. MNE activities 
abroad. Based on these results, we argue that bilateral tax treaties should be an important part of 
trade agreements between the United States and Latin American partners in anticipation of a Free 










Special thanks for assistance and advice from James McGibany and participants at the Canada-
United States Business Conference held at Indiana University and the Kelley School of Business 
Friday, April 11 – Saturday, April 12, 2003. 1 
I. Introduction 
 
Since the 1994-1995 peso crisis, a great deal of attention has been given to financial globalization 
and the destabilizing consequences of unbridled short-term capital flows.  In spite of this 
attention, the process of financial globalization does not depend on the actions of short-term 
investors.  Rather, as argued by Rugman (2000), the correct focus of financial globalization is on 
the activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and the long-term capital flows generated 
through their foreign direct investment (FDI) activities.  Rugman further argues that because the 
majority of MNE activity is regionally based, true financial globalization has yet to occur.  A 
recent study by the OECD (2003, p. 5) echoed this view, arguing that a significant share of FDI 
takes place among countries bound by regional trade agreements and among geographically close 
countries. 
  The defeat of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), the failed Seattle trade 
round, the sluggish progress of the Doha trade round, and chilled diplomatic relations among the 
world’s economic superpowers signals that if further economic integration is to occur at all, it 
will result from the actions of MNEs, and therefore proceed on a regional basis rather than a 
multilateral basis.  In other words, further economic integration depends on management 
decisions on where to engage in FDI and how to finance these FDI flows.  Hence, prudent 
policymaking requires recognition of the regional nature of long-term capital flows and an 
understanding of their financing patterns. As a result, countries can avoid distortionary policy 
actions so as to ensure an efficient allocation of productive resources. 
  The purpose of this paper is to review the patterns of U.S. outward FDI and to highlight 
differences regionally versus globally. Though these patterns have been discussed elsewhere, 
little attention has been given to the financing patterns of U.S. MNEs operating abroad, and again 
making comparisons regionally versus globally. Because further economic integration is likely to 
be to the south, we consider potential differences between triad FDI activity and North-South FDI 
activity.  We find a stark difference in corporate tax treatment among the triad nations as opposed 2 
to north-south relationships.  Specifically, there is a preponderance of long-standing bilateral tax 
treaties among triad nations and a lack of bilateral tax treaties between the United States and its 
potential Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) partners to the south. 
  Our contribution is twofold:  First, though a number of studies conclude that tax polices 
affect FDI and that FDI is becoming more sensitive to its tax treatment, we follow the advice of 
Hines (1997) and test the robustness of these conclusions by controlling for important 
macroeconomic factors.  Second, we extend the analysis of Blonigen and Davies (2000 and 2002) 
on the impact of tax treaties on FDI in two important ways.  First, we extend the period of 
analysis to cover the entire 1990s, a period in which FDI flows rose dramatically before settling 
to a level three times that prior to the 1990s (OECD, 2003), and by considering the impact of 
bilateral treaties on MNE financing patterns.  We find that total FDI flows are significantly 
affected by both the 1986 U.S. tax reform and by the existence of a bilateral tax treaty between 
the United States and the host nation.  However, when we decompose total FDI flows into their 
three forms – those financed by new equity, reinvested earnings, and intercompany debt – we see 
that both of these tax variables have different effects on equity financing versus retained earnings 
financing.  Further, the impact of recently negotiated or renegotiated treaties affects FDI flows 
differently than longstanding, not recently renegotiated, treaties.  Unfortunately, our model 
performs poorly in explaining intercompany debt flows.   
We conclude that tax policies have important consequences for FDI.  Bilateral tax 
treaties, in particular, present an interesting regional dimension because U.S. bilateral treaties 
exist primarily with NAFTA and European nations.
1  Attempts to create an FTAA need to include 
tax treaties in the similar manner that the NAFTA did.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section two briefly describes the 
existing microeconomic theory on FDI.  Section three describes general trends in U.S. outward 
FDI stock while section four describes U.S. outward FDI flows and how these flows are financed.  3 
Section five provides empirical evidence on tax treaties and other key determinants of these 
patterns.  Section six offers conclusions.  
II. Theoretical Background 
In this section, we outline the literature that identifies reasons for the rise of MNEs.  In the 
interest of brevity, we identify only the major themes of the literature, and refer the reader to 
Hejazi and von der Ruhr (2002) for a summary of specific articles.   
  The development of microeconomic theories to explain FDI are linked by their focus on 
firms’ efforts to reduce both explicit and implicit transactions costs.  Early models focus on the 
explicit costs that may be reduced by internalizing a transaction via FDI as opposed to engaging 
in an external, market-based transaction.  More recent models build upon earlier work by 
considering the effect of implicit costs, which may arise as a consequence of incomplete 
contracting. 
  The additional costs arising from incomplete contracting are important factors that 
influence how a firm organizes its transactions.  For example, the difficulty of generating 
incentive-compatible contracts with foreign sales agents as a means to serve a foreign market will 
have a significant influence on the FDI decision.  These models often hinge on the role of 
information and uncertainty about quality.  Uncertainty about quality implies that the firm must 
reveal its competitive advantage to receive its full value in the foreign market.  This may lead an 
agent who deals with the firm at arm’s length to behave opportunistically, or for the firm to 
sacrifice too much of its rents to a local agent.   
  Dunning (1988,1993a) summarizes the different motives for FDI in a single cohesive 
theory via his ownership, location, internalization framework (OLI).  According to this 
framework, for a firm to enter a foreign market via FDI rather than other potential options (such 
as direct exporting or licensing) the firm must have three unique advantages: (1) an ownership 
advantage, (2) an internalization advantage, and (3) a location advantage. The ownership 
advantage is the firm’s unique assets which confers upon it market power.  The internalization 4 
advantage refers to the firm’s inability to realize the full value of its ownership advantage through 
market transactions, thus causing the firm to deliver its product internally through FDI.  Finally, 
the location advantage refers to the firm locating a production process abroad to benefit from that 
country’s comparative advantage, or to locate close to the consumer in order to realize the value 
of its ownership advantage. 
  Though the majority of research on FDI has focused on manufacturing FDI, the OLI 
framework is particularly well suited to explaining the increasing role of service industries in 
FDI.  Services have unique characteristics that deserve attention in examining their contributions 
to FDI flows.  Depending on the immediacy of production and consumption of the service, export 
may not be feasible.  Second, services are used increasingly to coordinate fragmented production 
processes, and require a local presence where production is located.  Third, services are often 
knowledge-intensive, and therefore replicated at a low cost.  Finally, a key determinant of a 
service provider’s long-run success involves its ability to establish a reputation for consistently 
providing a high-quality service, and is best done through FDI.  Evidence suggests that FDI is the 
leading method by which service providers access a foreign market.  For instance, we may 
consider the ratio of affiliate sales to affiliate sales plus export sales to illustrate how important 
FDI sales are to services (Dunning 1993b).  For accounting services this ratio is 92 percent, and 
for advertising services it is 85 percent. 
  The rationale for engaging in FDI as established in the literature helps explain the 
industrial and geographic distribution of U.S. outward FDI seen in the data.  Services are the 
leading industry of both U.S. outward and inward FDI, and typically originate from or are located 
in other developed countries.  This may be attributed to the demand for services in developed 
economies as well as the fact that as production processes become increasingly fragmented, 
service firms are needed (called upon) to coordinate various production processes. 
  The last issue to consider relates to what method a firm uses to finance its FDI flows: 
new equity, reinvested earnings, or intercompany debt.  Little work has been done in this area.  A 5 
notable exception is Lipsey (1993) who compares financing flows across U.S. inward and 
outward FDI from 1950 through 1991.  He finds that U.S. firms tend to finance FDI abroad more 
consistently through reinvested earnings whereas foreign firms have a more varied pattern of 
financing. 
 
III. General Data Trends in U.S. Outward FDI Stock 
Before proceeding, something should be said about the construction of the FDI stock data.  U.S. 
FDI stock data are reported on a historical cost basis.  Retained earnings and new flows are in 
current dollars and are simply added to the previous year’s FDI stock (which are not in current 
dollars). This forms the balance of payments definition of FDI.  The market value of FDI stock at 
any point in time, however, is defined as the level of FDI in the previous period, plus retained 
earnings, plus net new flows of FDI, plus price appreciation (or less depreciation). It is this last 
component which is needed to convert FDI from historical costs to market values. Since these 
adjustments are unavailable, most FDI stock data are at historical costs as is the data presented here.
2   
Examination of the data clearly indicates that U.S. firms’ FDI decisions on where to 
locate have changed over time.  Exhibit 1 illustrates the distribution of the stock of U.S. FDI in 
five host regions: Europe, Canada, Latin America, Japan, and Australia and New Zealand.  The 
figure illustrates that Europe remains the dominant and increasingly important destination for 
U.S. outward FDI, accounting for about 52 percent of U.S. outward FDI in 2000. On the other 
hand, Canada has received less U.S. FDI over time.  Canada reached a high of 22 percent of U.S. 
outward FDI in 1984, and a low of 10 percent by 2000.
3 
Exhibit 1 Here 
  An interesting fact to draw from this figure refutes a popular belief about developed-
country FDI, namely that MNEs are driven to enter foreign markets in order to exploit cheap 
labor.  For world stocks of FDI in 2000, 67 percent of all inward FDI stocks were located in 
developed countries. Furthermore, 88 percent of these stocks originate in developed countries 6 
(UNCTAD 2001). For the United States specifically, approximately three quarters of its outward 
FDI stock was located in other developed countries and over 90 percent of its inward stock 
originates in other developed countries.  Therefore, the popular perception that MNEs, American 
and otherwise, engage in FDI primarily to exploit low-wage labor is clearly mistaken: market 
access and access to technology are far more important determinants of FDI. It may nevertheless 
be true that to the extent MNEs undertake FDI in developing countries it is for reasons of factor-
price differences. However, this is by no means the prime motivation for MNE activity abroad.  
  Exhibit 2 illustrates the changing composition of U.S. outward FDI among the following 
industries: petroleum, manufacturing, and producer services (the sum of wholesale trade, 
banking, finance, insurance, real estate, and other business services) sectors.
4 This figure reveals 
an interesting trend regarding the increasing importance of services FDI. The importance of 
petroleum FDI has fallen dramatically whereas manufacturing has fallen by less. The chart 
illustrates that services have significantly overtaken manufacturing in its share of U.S. outward 
FDI. As noted above, these trends can be attributed to several broad factors: restrictions on FDI in 
services have been liberalized relatively recently, there has been dramatic growth in services in 
the economies of the world, and the changing nature of international production. These trends are 
likely to continue given the increased importance of services in the GDP of the U.S. and other 
developed countries.   
  The importance of the third factor, namely the changing nature of international 
production – that is, the increasing fragmentation of production processes – should be 
highlighted.  These sub-production processes require business services to coordinate them.  
Hence, we see an increasing role for services in FDI.  It is also logical that the increase in services 
FDI followed manufacturing FDI.  Manufacturers led the FDI process and as their production is 
refined, they call on services to be provided in the foreign market (Raff and von der Ruhr 2001).  
Exhibit 2 here 7 
  The magnitudes of these stocks of services FDI also reflect on the importance of services 
in international trade.  The United States is the world leader in the export of services.  It 
dominated the share of total service exports in 1998, accounting for 18.1 percent of total service 
exports; with the next highest share, 7.7 percent, coming from Britain (Economist, 1999).  Many 
of these services are not easily traded for a number of reasons.  For instance, they may need to be 
produced and consumed at the same time, be subject to high trade barriers, or simply require 
frequent contact between the service provider and the consumer.  Thus, the majority of trade in 
these services is actually carried out through FDI rather than exports. In fact, in many industries, 
foreign markets cannot be serviced without a local presence, and hence FDI.  Additional 
understanding of FDI and trade in these service industries is important for policymakers, as the 
liberalization of trade in services has received considerable attention in recent trade negotiations.  
Our interest in regional FDI prompts consideration of the industrial breakdown of the 
stock of U.S. FDI in both Canada and Mexico.  Though not presented here, the FDI data suggests 
that some significant changes took place around 1994 in both countries.  All industries 
experienced significant increases in the stock of FDI in each country between 1994 and 2000.  
Further, in each country, the top three industries experiencing growth were banking, FIRE, and 
other business services FDI.  Perhaps because of market potential for growth, Mexico’s growth 
was lager in each category than Canada’s.   
Interestingly, the growth in regional manufacturing FDI has lagged behind the growth of 
manufacturing FDI globally.  This may be explained by the NAFTA; as more goods are traded 
freely, the need for manufacturing FDI to jump tariff and non-tariff trade barriers is decreased.  
Further, the growth in services FDI has grown more regionally than globally, reflecting the 
increased amount of trade that must be done “in person” thereby requiring a local presence.   
  
IV. U.S. FDI Flows and Financing 8 
To this point, we have focused on U.S. FDI stocks abroad. We now turn our focus to U.S. FDI 
outflows and how these flows are financed. We break U.S. outward FDI flows into their 
components: equity capital, reinvested earnings, and intercompany debt. The Bureau of Economic 
Analysis defines each type of flow as follows.  Equity capital outflows occur when a U.S. parent 
company increases its equity investment in one of its existing foreign affiliates or makes a new 
equity investment in a foreign business enterprise, either by acquiring an existing business or 
establishing a new one. Equity capital inflows occur when a U.S. parent company reduces its 
equity investment in one of its existing foreign affiliates.   
Intercompany debt flows are of two types: U.S. parent receivables and U.S. parent 
payables.  U.S. parent receivable represent loans that a U.S. parent extends to its foreign affiliate.  
An outflow on U.S. parent receivables occurs when the parent extends a new loan to its affiliate; 
an inflow occurs when an affiliate repays part or all of a loan from its U.S. parent.  U.S. parent 
payables represent loans that a foreign affiliate extends to its U.S. parent.  An outflow on U.S. 
parent payables occurs when the parent repays part or all of its loan from its foreign affiliate.  An 
inflow occurs when an affiliate extends a new loan to the U.S. parent.  
Reinvested earnings are the parent’s claim on undistributed after-tax earnings of its 
foreign affiliate. They are computed as the difference between the parent’s claim on its affiliate’s 
current earnings and the dividends that the affiliate pays to a parent in a given period.  They are 
positive when a parent has a claim on positive current earnings of its affiliate in excess of the 
dividends that it receives from its affiliate. 
  To better understand the general patterns of these flows, we accumulate the data and 
present it for the entire period, 1982 through 2000, Table 1.  The top panel of each table provides 
the dollar value of the three forms of financing, and the bottom panel provides the share of 
financing by country or region considered. As expected, there is a great amount of heterogeneity 
across countries and regions. There are, however, some generalizations. First, reinvested earnings 
are almost always more important than either new equity financing or intercompany debt. (The 9 
exceptions to this are petroleum FDI in Mexico and Central America, and services investment in 
Mexico, Australia, and South America.) 
Table 1 here 
  The bottom three rows of Table 1 give the total, regional, and global distributions of U.S. 
outward FDI, where regional FDI is U.S. FDI located in Canada and Mexico, whereas global FDI 
is U.S. FDI to the rest of the world. These aggregates are plotted in Exhibit 3. The following 
patterns clearly emerge. First, reinvested earnings are the most important source of financing for 
U.S. MNEs operating abroad, and this is true at both the aggregate and industry levels. 
Furthermore, reinvested earnings are more important regionally than globally, and this is true at 
the aggregate and industry levels. Although equity finance is less important as a source of finance 
for U.S. MNEs operating abroad than is reinvested earnings, equity finance is more important 
than intercompany debt. Furthermore, equity finance is more important globally than regionally 
for total outward FDI as well as in manufacturing, whereas it is more important regionally than 
globally in services. Of course, the interesting question that arises is what is one to make of these 
differences. This is the question to which we now turn.  
Exhibit 3 here 
Much attention has been paid to the corporate decision as to whether to finance capital 
internally or externally. It is generally the case that internal financing sources are less costly than 
are external ones, and hence it is advised that corporations first use internal financing sources. In 
addition, firms that do not wish to disclose information about their operations to outsiders are also 
less likely to go to outside sources for funds. Finally, issues relating to asymmetric information 
often place limits on a company’s ability to raise capital in the external capital market. For 
example, when a company issues new shares, it is can be read as a signal that management 
believes that shares are overvalued, and hence may result in a reduction in share prices.   10 
We hypothesize that the patterns of financing we have seen bilaterally, by region and 
globally, should depend on host country characteristics such as the volume of real economic 
activity, openness to trade, openness to direct investment, distance, financial market development, 
and adjacency.  In addition, it has been shown in the literature that FDI activity is sensitive to 
changes in tax policies and that this sensitivity has risen over time.
5  For example, the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 attempted to address perceived incentives for MNEs to invest abroad as 
opposed to domestically as created in the former tax code.  Specifically, changes in cross 
crediting, or foreign tax averaging, and changes in tax definitions were designed to balance U.S. 
tax rules in this regard.  The reform act also resulted in different foreign tax credits for different 
types of activity, such as financial services, creating potential differences in FDI activity across 
sectors (U.S. Congress, 1987). 
  Though the Tax Reform Act of 1986 affected income earned in all other nations the 
same, bilateral tax treaties created the possibility for differential tax treatment.  Blonigen and 
Davies (2000) argue that bilateral tax treaties result in four outcomes; standardization of tax 
definitions, promotion of the exchange of tax information thereby improving the ability of 
policymakers to enforce tax laws, prevention of tax arbitrage or “shopping” for the lowest tax 
treatment, and affecting overall taxation of MNEs by reducing the coincidence of double taxation 
and taxes on remittances.  They show that over time bilateral tax treaties affect U.S. inward and 
outward FDI activity. Table 2 provides the countries in our sample and dates of their bilateral tax 
treaties with the United States, if one exists. 
Table 2 Here 
We consider both the effect of bilateral tax treaties and the changes in foreign taxation 
brought about by the Tax Reform Act of 1986.  We contribute to the findings of Blonigen and 
Davies–who consider tax treaties in the context of a gravity model–by including more recent data 
and considering the impact of bilateral tax treaties on methods of financing.
6  We also contribute 
to the literature on the Tax Reform Act of 1986 by considering the impact of the act in the context 11 
of the main empirical framework of FDI analysis, a gravity model, and by allowing for vintage 
effects of the tax act.  Further, we investigate whether there are differences between the effects of 
new or newly renegotiated treaties and longstanding, not recently renegotiated, treaties on FDI 
flows. 
To this point we have considered the theory of FDI location and the actual patterns of 
U.S. outward FDI and patterns of financing.  We have also acknowledged the potential impact tax 
polices can have on FDI flows as well as methods of financing.  Together with a reconsideration 
of the data presented in Table 2 leads us to the following conclusions:  U.S. outward FDI is 
concentrated among nations with whom the United States has longstanding bilateral tax treaties, 
primarily Western European nations.  The exceptions are as follows: Canada, who has the second 
oldest tax treaty with the United States; Mexico, whose tax treaty coincided with the NAFTA; 
and the 2000 tax treaty with Venezuela.  As argued by Hines (1997), increased magnitudes of 
FDI mean that costs associated with inefficient tax laws become much greater. If indeed tax 
policies affect FDI patterns and financing strategies, then greater attention must be paid to tax 
policies to ensure that the potential benefits of an FTAA are achieved. Given the on-going 
negotiations with respect to an FTAA and the evidence of the importance of tax policies to the 
location decisions of MNEs, it is surprising that there has been little or no attempt to harmonize 
corporate tax treatment between the U.S. and Latin America generally. We argue here that such 
treaties will serve to stimulate further long-term capital flows and hence contribute to further 
economic integration between the United States and Latin America. Furthermore, such treaties 
also impact the methods of financing used by MNEs as they expand their operations abroad. 
 
V. Empirical Results 
To examine this issue we extend the standard gravity model to include tax policies and treaties. 
We examine the impact the 1986 U.S. tax reform as well as the introduction (or existence) of 
bilateral tax treaties have had on both the patterns of FDI and how these FDI flows are financed. 12 
The model estimated includes host county real GDP, the exchange rate (measured as foreign 
currency per U.S. dollar), host country openness to trade, host country openness to FDI, an 
adjacency dummy, a NAFTA dummy, distance measures, host country financial depth, a dummy 
for Latin American countries not including Mexico, and dummy variables to capture the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 and the existence of a bilateral tax treaty.
7 
The Penn world tables provide data on host real GDP, the bilateral exchange rate, and 
host country openness to trade.  We calculate host openness to FDI as the ratio of host stock of 
inward FDI to host GDP for each year.  Host country financial depth is calculated as a ratio of 
liquid liabilities of the financial system to GDP.
 8   All of these factors are expected to have a 
positive influence on U.S. outward FDI.  Distance between the host country and the United States 
is gathered from the Bali Online Corporation, and may be argued to have either a positive or 
negative effect on FDI, though the gravity model suggests a negative influence.  The adjacency 
dummy is expected to have a positive influence on attracting U.S. FDI.  The NAFTA dummy is 
also expected to have a positive influence to reflect increased regional economic integration.  The 
Latin America Dummy is included to investigate whether, after accounting for other relevant 
factors, there remains a tendency for FDI flows to avoid Latin America. 
To capture the influence of the 1986 U.S. tax reform and the effect of bilateral tax 
treaties, we allow for each policy to have an immediate effect on U.S. FDI patterns. Furthermore, 
following Blonigen and Davies (2000), we acknowledge that the impact of these treaties may 
change over time, and possibly in a non-linear fashion.  To investigate this effect we include a 
variable reflecting the age of each tax treaty, in years, as well as the square of their ages.  Finally, 
following Blonigen and Davies (2002), we distinguish between new treaties -- those that took 
effect during our sample period, and old treaties – those that were in effect at the beginning of our 
sample period.  We extend this analysis to also consider new and old treaties’ vintage effects. 
We investigate the effects of the 1986 U.S. tax reform and bilateral tax treaties on U.S. 
FDI by examining the effect each has on various measures of FDI.  That is, we estimate the 13 
model first with total U.S. outward FDI flows as the dependent variable. These flows are then 
decomposed in their components: new equity flows, reinvested earnings flows, and intercompany 
debt flows to see how each type of flow is affected by our control variables.   
  The estimation results for various specifications are given in Tables 3 through 7.  Table 3 
provides the results when we account for bilateral tax treaties and the U.S. tax code change using 
simple intercept dummy variables.  Table 4 considers the results when we allow for these policy 
changes to have non-linear effects (vintage) effects over time. Following Blonigen and Davies 
(2000), we omit the intercept dummy variables associated with the bilateral tax treaties and the 
U.S. tax reform and replace each with its age and the square of its age.  The coefficient of the age 
variable may be interpreted to show whether the impact of the policy change on the FDI flow 
increased or decreased over time.  Further, the coefficient of the square of the age variable may 
be interpreted to show whether the increasing or decreasing impact of the policy change occurred 
at a rate that increased or decreased over time.  Tables 5 through 7 repeat the analysis, but 
distinguish between old and new treaties. 
Our empirical results for the standard gravity model are generally in conformity with the 
existing literature. As a result, we focus here on the analysis as it relates to the U.S. tax code 
change and tax treaty variables, and regional implications suggested by the coefficients on the 
NAFTA and Latin America dummy variables.    
The first column of results in Table 3 suggest that the U.S. tax reform of 1986 had a 
positive and statistically significant impact on U.S. total FDI flows, while the existence of 
bilateral treaties have no positive effect on U.S. FDI flows.   It also illustrates that NAFTA had a 
positive effect on flows, while Latin American countries receive statistically significantly less 
U.S. FDI flows than non-Latin American countries.  The regression results in the second through 
fourth columns examine the impact of the control variables on the type of financing flows.   We 
see that the impact of the NAFTA and U.S. tax code change dummy variables alternate across 
flows.  Neither of these dummy variables are statistically significant for equity flows, yet are both 14 
statistically significantly positive for reinvested earnings flows.  It is of note to see that other 
Latin American countries receive statistically significantly less U.S. FDI flows for both equity 
and reinvested earnings. 
Table 4 provides the results when we replace the policy dummy variables with the 
vintage effect variables.  The results indicate that bilateral tax treaties do affect total flows (as 
well as all the forms of financing), and suggest that the U. S. tax code change of 1986 impact only 
reinvested earnings.  The results for total flows, reinvested earnings, and intercompany debt 
provide statistically significant vintage effects suggesting that effect of the policy change 
decreases at an increasing rate over time.  The results for equity flows illustrate that the 
coefficient associated with the square of the age of the tax treaty is positive and significant while 
the age variable is statistically insignificant.  We interpret the combination of a significant 
squared age variable with an insignificant age variable to suggest that at tax treaty has a (near) 
linear, rather than quadratic, effect over time 
Tables 3 through 7 here 
  Table 5 reexamines the specification used in Table 3, but separates the bilateral treaties 
into “old” treaties--those that existed at the beginning of our sample (1982), and “new” treaties—
those that were negotiated during our sample period.  Blonigen and Davies (2002) suggest that 
this is important because past studies that represent all bilateral treaties with an intercept dummy 
variable are reflecting treaties that, for the most part, were in effect when a sample period began.  
Thus, a positive and significant coefficient associated with such a dummy variable may be the 
result of the treaty or some other unobserved factor.  This problem may be avoided by separating 
new from old treaties.  The results in Table 5 suggest that old treaties have no effect on FDI flows 
at all.  On the other hand, the results for new treaties suggest that there is a statistically significant 
negative influence on overall flows and reinvested earnings flows.  There is no statistically 
significant influence on equity or intercompany debt flows.  It may be argued that the negative 
influence of new treaties is the result of decreased FDI flows as firms find it more difficult to 15 
avoid taxes.  However, we would still expect old treaties to be associated with increased FDI 
flows, based on previous results. 
Table 6 attempts to gain more insight on this issue by allowing both new and old treaties 
to have non-linear effects over time.  The results shown in Table 6 are much the same as those 
found in Table 4.  Of interest is that new treaties have no statistically significant vintage effects 
on flows.  One reason that there is no statistically significant impact associated with new treaties 
is because there are relatively few observations associated with new treaties.  Of the 26 countries 
in our sample with whom the U.S. has treaties, only 5 are new, and all 5 of these were negotiated 
in 1991 or later.  We do, however, have data on the latest revision of old treaties.  If we interpret 
these revisions as a form of a new treaty, we may be able to comment on different effects of old 
treaties that have not been renegotiated during our sample period compared to the effects of either 
new treaties or existing treaties that were renegotiated during the sample period.  To test this, we 
estimate the vintage effects of new and renegotiated versus non-renegotiated treaties. The results 
are provided in Table 7.  With respect to existing treaties that were not renegotiated during our 
sample, we find results similar to those discussed earlier; their effect decreases at an increasing 
rate over time.  However, with respect to new or renegotiated treaties, the effect of the treaty on 
total and reinvested earnings FDI flows rises over time.  The remaining results are similar to 
those found earlier.    
  In general, we find that there are important regional aspects to FDI.  This is reflected first 
by the NAFTA and Latin America variables.  Their significance, however, varies by type of FDI 
flow suggesting that regionalization will impact the form of financing used to engage in FDI.  
Second, an implication for the negotiation of regional trade agreements is reflected by the impact 
of the tax treaties on FDI, as the preponderance of U.S. bilateral tax treaties are with European 
nations, rather than Latin American nations.  Given the evidence that tax policies affect FDI 
flows and financing, policy makers may want to increase the attention paid to tax policies in order 
to maximize the potential benefits of regional trade agreements such as the FTAA.  We suggest 16 
that such policies will help to foster further long-term capital flows and contribute to further 
economic integration between the United States and Latin America.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
The recent trade pact signed between the United States and Chile signals continuing and perhaps 
renewed interest in creating a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas.  Such an agreement is 
likely to strengthen regional integration vis-à-vis foreign direct investment.  The results presented 
here are consistent with previous literature in that host country characteristics are important 
determinants of FDI.  In addition, we show that tax policies – both aggregate tax changes and 
bilateral treaties – affect FDI.  The latter has an important regional aspect because the 2000 tax 
treaty with Venezuela is the only existing bilateral treaty between the United States and a Latin 
American nation.  We conclude that bilateral tax treaties with Latin American partners should be 
an important component of trade agreements.  We suggest that additional research continue to 
focus on regional aspects of FDI.  In addition, future research should also focus on explaining the 
differential effects we document of tax policies on alternative forms of FDI financing. 17 
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Exhibit 3: Total, Regional, and Global Distribution of FDI22 
TABLE 1:  PATTERN OF ACCUMULATED FDI 
  Total Flows  Equity Flows  Reinvested Earnings  Inter Company 
Debt 
  Millions, US dollars 
Canada 98,159  25,894  64,669  7,599 
Mexico 34,068  13,330  21,560  -820 
        
Europe 570,190  221,008  275,878 73,298 
Japan 30,565  3,605  20,957 6,006 
Asia and Pacific  158,580  45,244  102,255  15,001 
Australia 30,326  15,220 15,044  -51 
New Zealand  3,055  857  1,928  1,220 
Other Asia  150,553  43,448  93,766  13,339 
Latin America  198,018  70,133  113,435  14,450 
South America  75,738  29,096  38,762  7,880 
Central America  50,062  15,826  34,202  30 
        
Total Outward  1,051,817  367,795  570,236  113,788 
Regional 132,227  39,224  86,229  6,779 
Global 919,590  328,571  484,007 107,009 
 
Percentage Distribution 
  Total Flows  Equity Flows  Reinvested Earnings  Inter Company 
Debt 
Canada 100.0  26.4  65.9  7.7 
Mexico 100.0  39.1  63.3  -2.4 
        
Europe 100.0  38.8  48.4  12.9 
Japan 100.0  11.8  68.6  19.6 
Asia and Pacific  100.0  28.5  64.5  9.5 
Australia 100.0  50.2  49.6  -0.2 
New Zealand  100.0  28.1  63.1  39.9 
Other Asia  100.0  28.9  62.3  8.9 
Latin America  100.0  35.4  57.3  7.3 
South America  100.0  38.4  51.2  10.4 
Central America  100.0  31.6  68.3  0.1 
        
Total Outward  100.0  35.0 54.2  10.8 
Regional 100.0  29.7 65.2  5.1 
Global  100.0  35.7 52.6  11.6 23 
TABLE 2:  U.S. BILATERAL TAX AGREMENTS 
(Date of last revision in parentheses.) 
 
Country  Date of Tax Treaty  Country  Date of Tax Treaty 
Argentina  NA  Israel    1975 (1993) 
Australia  1953 (1982)  Italy  1955 (1984) 
Austria  1956 (1996)  Japan  1954 (1971) 
Belgium 1948  (1970)  Luxembourg  1963 
Brazil NA  Mexico  1994 
Canada 1941  (1980)  Netherlands 1949  (1992) 
Chile  NA  New Zealand  1948 (1982) 
Columbia NA  Norway  1951  (1971) 
Costa Rica  NA  Panama  NA 
Denmark 1948  Peru  NA 
Ecuador NA  Portugal  1994 
Finland  1940 (1994)  South Africa  1953-1987 (1997) 
France 1940  (1994)  Spain  1991 
Germany  1954 (1989)  Sweden  1940 (1994) 
Greece 1950  Switzerland  1951  (1996) 
Guatemala NA  Turkey  1997 
Honduras  NA  United Kingdom  1945 (1975) 
Hong Kong  NA  Venezuela  2000 
Ireland 1952  (1997)     
Source:  Blonigen and Davies (2000), U.S. Internal Revenue Service, www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty. 
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Table 3: OLS Results with Policy Intercept Dummy Variables 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Total Flows Equity Reinvested Intercompany
EarningsD e b t
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(standard error) (standard error) (standard error) (standard error)
Intercept 2390.998* 1410.502* 466.2427 140.3648
(1298.336) (767.9833) (530.746) (266.975)
Exchange Rate 0.001034 0.001445 -0.000197 -0.000268
(0.003346) (0.001621) (0.00154) (0.001308)
RGDP 0.00000236*** 0.00000127*** 0.00000102*** 0.000000244***
(0.000000486) (0.000000283) (0.0000002) (0.0000000875)
Trade Openness 6.756114 3.994348 6.760696*** -0.883805
(5.182136) (2.806737) (2.212877) (1.076552)
FDI Openness 4806.343*** 1667.887*** 2227.474*** 546.4935*
(1128.854) (581.656) (494.2446) (283.6991)
Distance -0.469187*** -0.262452*** -0.18033*** -0.040792**
(0.115923) (0.071689) (0.046004) (0.01902)
Adjacency -1129.672 -455.01 55.5195 -249.0719
(1418.008) (790.4738) (588.3362) (274.2096)
NAFTA 4015.179*** 48.84597 2438.061*** 47.57912
(1355.872) (689.3674) (600.2696) (367.8324)
Latin America -2460.711*** -1346.902*** -742.9993** -96.36033
(814.8395) (447.4519) (343.2194) (180.4096)
Financial Depth 17.06398*** 6.155461** 9.275997*** 2.152411
(6.071736) (3.056802) (2.701323) (1.657041)
Tax Treaty -258.6206 17.19638 -101.9192 30.71368
(541.1791) (278.622) (236.9608) (134.7974)
US Code 745.316*** 206.2625 346.4637*** 146.401
(285.5887) (141.4346) (129.2095) (94.05135)
rho 0.734566*** 0.818147*** 0.672684***
(0.028161) (0.023582) (0.031773)
# of obs 703 703 703 703
R-squared 0.599592 0.647757 0.566743 0.040349
Adjusted R-squared 0.592618 0.641622 0.559197 0.025072
Durbin-Watson stat 2.234882 1.929308 2.192388 2.051686
F-statistic 85.97856 105.5865 75.10666 2.641228
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.002577
*** => p<=1%
**  => p<=5%
*   => p<=10%25 
Table 4: OLS Results with Policy Vintage Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: Total Flows Equity Reinvested Intercompany
EarningsD e b t
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(standard error) (standard error) (standard error) (standard error)
Intercept 1986.332* 1006.545 290.2277 165.5153
(1215.387) (777.4113) (505.6427) (258.2056)
Exchange Rate 0.000736 0.001822 -0.000249 9.07E-05
(0.003358) (0.001683') (0.001523) (0.001337)
RGDP 0.00000154*** 0.000000937*** 0.000000659*** 0.000000239***
(0.000000434) (0.000000281) (0.00000018) (0.0000000881)
Trade Openness 0.237964 1.62929 4.071109** -0.52913
(4.82778) (2.885485) (2.044864) (1.081579)
FDI Openness 3953.587*** 1380.242** 1745.852*** 497.247*
(1076.705) (587.728) (469.1828) (285.104)
Distance -0.319987*** -0.208677*** -0.117051*** -0.033044*
(0.099893) (0.06761) (0.040952) (0.019118)
Adjacency -1033.721 -290.3642 224.5633 -303.4336
(1276.784) (774.7494) (536.5636) (272.051)
NAFTA 3323.259*** -32.52797 2050.376*** 13.72388
(1245.887) (663.3397) (549.3714) (363.1192)
Latin America -1492.026** -874.8826** -278.9975 -81.56623
(765.9256) (456.3038) (322.6803) (170.0483)
Financial Depth 16.88074*** 6.42706** 9.18428*** 2.143535
(5.756514) (3.039258) (2.545483) (1.662606)
Treaty Age -145.292*** -28.74515 -57.66685*** -22.84597***
(35.09006) (20.35175) (15.15146) (8.86004)
Treaty Age Squared 2.588738*** 0.625386** 1.088599*** 0.394432***
(0.507272) (0.283191) (0.221561) (0.134605)
US Code Age -116.9781 8.942824 -117.9173** 14.47315
(128.6951) (74.48041) (55.30776) (29.73672)
US Code Age Sqrd 11.96157 0.072694 10.56986*** -1.266869
(9.174592) (5.267248) (3.949976) (2.251152)
rho 0.681555*** 0.796108*** 0.634606***
(0.029422) (0.025153) (0.031967)
# of obs 703 703 703 703
R-squared 0.625679 0.654324 0.602483 0.053816
Adjusted R-squared 0.618051 0.647279 0.594383 0.035963
Durbin-Watson stat 2.219371 1.925813 2.171858 2.079995
F-statistic 82.02301 92.88628 74.37352 3.014473
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000248
*** => p<=1%
**  => p<=5%
*   => p<=10%26 
 
Table 5: OLS Results with Intercept Dummies 






Dependent Variable: Total Flows Equity Reinvested Intercompany
EarningsD e b t
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(standard error) (standard error) (standard error) (standard error)
Intercept 1897.577 1196.149 160.0472 138.2356
(1310.629) (786.7915) (528.3477) (267.1338)
Exchange Rate 0.002912 0.002152 0.001332 -5.22E-06
(0.003545) (0.001722) (0.001622) (0.00139)
RGDP 0.00000233*** 0.00000127*** 0.000000983*** 0.000000241***
(0.000000481) (0.000000283) (0.000000196) (0.0000000877)
Trade Openness 7.324569 4.414229 6.94108*** -0.918487
(5.161508) (2.828605) (2.183213) (1.078843)
FDI Openness 4540.495*** 1560.182*** 2048.849*** 539.6816*
(1132.939) (588.0278) (491.0563) (284.0969)
Distance -0.449318*** -0.255236*** -0.168625*** -0.04112**
(0.114393) (0.071832) (0.044827) (0.019038)
Adjacency -869.2466 -332.117 214.5435 -251.2442
(1411.974) (796.5329) (578.9915) (274.3723)
NAFTA 4426.527*** 182.5853 2789.174*** 106.0717
(1372.711) (697.7931) (605.3129) (382.3874)
Latin America -2052.986*** -1187.64*** -481.0064 -93.11673
(835.2624) (465.251) (345.3956) (180.5906)
Financial Depth 16.96255*** 6.070665** 9.303445*** 2.199829
(6.048191) (3.056389) (2.670605) (1.659997)
Old Treaty 151.1781 201.7496 176.9668 38.99447
(593.7633) (317.6082) (252.037) (135.6631)
New Treaty -1370.124* -527.9158 -1059.531*** -127.4225
(841.2151) (434.3309) (366.1925) (226.239)
US Code 775.3883*** 212.2927 373.1139*** 151.4346*
(285.4127) (141.4742) (128.4705) (94.52132)
rho 0.729231*** 0.818177*** 0.663887***
(0.028389) (0.023616) (0.0321)
# of obs 703 703 703 703
R-squared 0.601115 0.648513 0.571924 0.04079
Adjusted R-squared 0.593578 0.641871 0.563835 0.024108
Durbin-Watson stat 2.233291 1.930825 2.188877 2.053434
F-statistic 79.75434 97.64585 70.70692 2.290585
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.005774
*** => p<=1%
**  => p<=5%
*   => p<=10%27 
Table 6: OLS Results with Policy Vintage Effects 
Distinguishing between “Old” and “New” Policies   
  
Dependent Variable: Total Flows Equity Reinvested Intercompany
EarningsD e b t
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(standard error) (standard error) (standard error) (standard error)
Intercept 1948.154 959.9263 219.1941 186.2346
(1245.17) (793.8343) (518.2027) (267.4043)
Exchange Rate 0.001187 0.001635 -0.000238 0.000223
(0.003704) (0.001885) (0.001668) (0.001406)
RGDP 0.00000155*** 0.000000936*** 0.000000663*** 0.000000239***
(0.000000434) (0.000000283) (0.00000018) (0.0000000882)
Trade Openness 0.467813 1.715098 4.277789** -0.581508
(4.868905) (2.929088) (2.06183) (1.097087)
FDI Openness 3884.586*** 1353.541** 1680.823*** 506.4508*
(1091.772) (600.2898) (474.5537) (287.0878)
Distance -0.321453*** -0.206991*** -0.115564*** -0.03423*
(0.100672) (0.068144) (0.041292) (0.019541)
Adjacency -910.1582 -254.0462 319.7619 -314.2781
(1303.952) (804.0701) (545.552) (274.6353)
NAFTA 3443.267*** -33.56252 2126.397*** 34.80579
(1266.675) (667.8072) (560.7773) (383.32)
Latin America -1449.302* -831.8581* -215.6513 -97.84161
(800.4534) (481.808) (336.2874) (178.5576)
Financial Depth 16.99309*** 6.491966** 9.336025*** 2.144226
(5.774627) (3.051147) (2.553096) (1.665593)
Old Treaty Age -140.1881*** -28.09124 -54.2885*** -22.74129**
(36.36879) (21.38629) (15.62238) (8.971118)
Old Treaty Age Sqrd 2.499821*** 0.622653** 1.038299*** 0.389111***
(0.53378) (0.302818) (0.231948) (0.138338)
New Treaty Age -103.9636 106.3811 86.09549 -73.39968
(733.914) (384.369) (325.8666) (235.585)
New Treaty Age Sqrd -6.962847 -20.09771 -32.98757 13.60902
(128.5454) (65.86127) (57.67962) (48.10536)
US Code Age -117.6438 7.37869 -120.5049** 15.34457
(129.0898) (74.75556) (55.53507) (29.95737)
US Code Age Sqrd 12.4494 0.140215 10.95583*** -1.279819
(9.224124) (5.29576) (3.973139) (2.276102)
rho 0.68071*** 0.796127*** 0.634013***
(0.029517) (0.025191) (0.032147)
# of obs 703 703 703 703
R-squared 0.625842 0.654371 0.603011 0.05395
Adjusted R-squared 0.617102 0.646298 0.593738 0.033294
Durbin-Watson stat 2.218578 1.925538 2.16934 2.079795
F-statistic 71.61095 81.05581 65.03059 2.611827
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000771
*** => p<=1%
**  => p<=5%
*   => p<=10%28 
Table 7: OLS Results with Policy Vintage Effects of  
Renegotiated and New Treaties 
Dependent Variable: Total Flows Equity Reinvested Intercompany 
EarningsD e b t
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(standard error) (standard error) (standard error) (standard error)
Intercept 1699.33* 780.3442 508.9175 3.075159
(1022.126) (652.3382) (452.2301) (217.5358)
Exchange Rate -0.000919 0.001169 -0.001158 -0.000124
(0.003262) (0.001641) (0.001474) (0.00131)
RGDP 0.00000136*** 0.000000711*** 0.000000672*** 0.000000222***
(0.000000412) (0.000000261) (0.000000183) (0.0000000871)
Trade Openness 3.339336 0.78943 6.00276*** -0.068679
(4.698731) (2.755729) (2.10126) (1.098735)
FDI Openness 3879.257*** 1118.769** 1983.629*** 354.0545
(1038.016) (570.2075) (465.1022) (278.8756)
Distance -0.258555*** -0.138067** -0.121424*** -0.016164
(0.095122) (0.062194) (0.042109) (0.019266)
Adjacency -1905.494 -624.516 -419.4268 -370.172
(1177.894) (705.5877) (525.2503) (259.2946)
NAFTA 2532.564** -289.1739 1639.025*** -252.5523
(1215.349) (647.7248) (546.1358) (364.1454)
Latin America -1266.431** -671.8397* -389.9264 15.69146
(614.9313) (377.0831) (272.4496) (135.7908)
Financial Depth 9.859731* 4.184614 6.163633*** 0.909379
(5.593073) (2.970044) (2.514533) (1.661198)
Renegotiated Treaty Age  248.931* 41.75884 209.3921*** 61.67027
(147.3215) (79.74925) (66.08921) (42.14519)
Renegotiated Treaty Age Sqrd  -2.168854 -0.928431 -5.648716 -2.994339
(9.602233) (5.08027) (4.32566) (2.967591)
Non-Renegotitiated Age -306.8492*** -104.8517*** -146.0534*** -41.38141***
(42.82285) (23.58389) (19.61788) (11.3188)
Non-Renegotitiated Age Sqrd 5.545694*** 2.032652*** 2.624237*** 0.793502***
(0.708233) (0.389116) (0.325763) (0.188127)
US Code Age -90.96538 6.318191 -117.0661** 17.74644
(122.6063) (70.59345) (55.24108) (29.0932)
US Code Age Sqrd 8.158158 0.379379 8.461148** -1.674457
(8.885023) (5.065174) (3.991925) (2.243413)
rho 0.666505*** 0.76915*** 0.65762***
(0.029738) (0.025709) (0.03192)
# of obs 703 703 703 703
R-squared 0.642705 0.667761 0.624864 0.07762
Adjusted R-squared 0.63436 0.66 0.616102 0.057481
Durbin-Watson stat 2.221935 1.930416 2.178857 2.145222
F-statistic 77.01162 86.04791 71.31278 3.854161
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000001
*** => p<=1%
**  => p<=5%
*   => p<=10%29 
NOTES 
                                                 
1 The second oldest U.S. bilateral treaty is with Canada.  The bilateral tax treaty with Mexico, 
however, coincided with the NAFTA. 
 
2 The U.S. Department of Commerce (1995) has published U.S. stock figures on the basis of 
historical cost, replacement cost, and market values, but the country and sectoral data are available 
only on a historical (book value) basis. There are a variety of private and semi-official estimates of 
the different valuations for the U.S. and U.K. stocks of FDI (Bellak and Cantwell, 1996). A 
straightforward way to adjust stock values is through changes in security prices, as utilized in Gray 
and Rugman (1994) but this is subject to a number of criticisms as noted in Bellak and Cantwell. We 
use the unadjusted data. 
 
3 The reduction in Canada's share of  U.S. FDI has been attributed in part to the Canada-U.S. FTA 
and the NAFTA: the importance of a local presence by U.S. firms in Canada has been 
significantly reduced as border restrictions have fallen [Safarian and Hejazi  (2001), Rugman 
(1990)]. 
 
4 The role of other business services (the majority of which are business services such as 
accounting, management consulting, marketing, etc.) has overtaken banking as an outward source 
of service FDI. 
 
5 See Hines (1997) for an extensive summary of the literature on taxation and FDI.  See Altshuler, 
Grubert and Newlon (2001) for evidence on the rising sensitivity of FDI to taxation.  
  
6 Blonigen and Davies examine the period 1966 through 1992.  Our data period is more recent, 
1982 through 2000, and covers a period when FDI activity increased dramatically. 
 
7 The adjacency dummy is always unity for Mexico and Canada and zero for all others.  The 
NAFTA dummy is zero for all countries until 1994 and thereafter when it is unity for Mexico and 
Canada.  Both dummies are included so as to discern between the two effects. 
8 See King and Levine (1993) for a discussion of alternative measures of financial market depth. 